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BOOK REVIEWS
Cases and Materials on the Law of Damages. By Charles T. McCormick. The Foundation Press, Chicago. Pp. xv, 798. 1935.
Handbook on the Law of Damages. By Charles T. McCormick. West
Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. (Hornbook Series.) Pp. xiv, 811.
1935.
A criticism occasionally directed at the modern law school and its
teaching methods is that it tends to stress too much the academic,
philosophical and historical approaches to the study of law and to ignore
or slight the practical approach. Certainly, if a law school acquaints its
students with the cultural background of their chosen profession and
sends them out into practice equipped with a thorough foundation upon
which to build in years to come, it is a matter for gratification. Nevertheless, the charge that the law school is overlooking the fact that its
chief purpose is to train men for the practice of law, is one that is entitled to serious consideration. Consequently, any piece of work which
brings home to the law student and to the law teacher the practical and
procedural problems of the law, without sacrificing to any substantial
degree the broad cultural and historical precepts and philosophies, is
worthy of note and commendation.
Professor McCormick appears to have accomplished this result so
far as the field of damages is concerned in the two books, one a casebook and the other a text, recently written by him upon the subject of
Damages. In the introductory chapter of the Handbook, the author
states that, although he has made no attempt to separate with exactness
the kindred questions of liability and damages, he has sought throughout
to place the emphasis upon the problems of planning and presenting a
case in respect to the amount of recoveiy and upon the technique of
measuring compensation in jury triats. Throughout both the textbook
and the casebook, the author has adhered religiously to this method of
presentation. This" emphasis upon the factors and elements which the
practitioner should consider in "building-up" his case makes these
books valuable to those engaged in practicing law as well as to those
engaged in teaching it.
There has been a tendency in recent years to dismember the courses
in Damages and apportion it piece-meal among various other substantive
law courses, such as Contracts, Torts and Property, where, in most instances, it expired speedily. The tendency was a natural one which
resulted from an erroneous impression of the fundamental nature of
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the course, an impression which was occasioned in turn by the undue
emphasis given to the question of "proximate cause" and other basic
doctrines which are normally dealt with in the above-mentioned fields of
substantive law. Professor McCormick's emphasis upon problems of
Procedure and Evidence serves to place the subject in the proper perspective, and, it is hoped, will help to restore it to its former status as
an individual, integrated and important law school subject.
Both the Casebook and the Handbook adopt substantially the same
approach to the problem. Both books are divided into five main parts:
(1) procedure; (2) rules, standards and elements of damages applicable
generally; (3) damages in tort actions; (4) compensation for property
taken by the public; and (5) damages for breach of control. The cases
selected give the books a distinctly modern flavor. Almost two-thirds
of the principal cases used in the case book were decided within the last
twenty-five years, and only about one-fifth of those used were decided
prior to 1900. About ten per cent of the cases are United States Supreme Court cases, and about ten per cent are New York cases. Except
for a few lower federal court decisions and even fewer English decisions,
the rest of the cases were decided 'by state courts. Almost every state
has contributed one or more decisions. The small number of English
cases, as compared with the number usually found in casebooks on
Damages, is striking. Professor McCormick has recognized that Damages, as a question of law, is much more lively in the United States than
in England and he has looked to the United States for about ninetyseven per cent of his case material.
Adequate and instructive footnotes are contained in both books. In
addition, the casebook contains a number of interesting and enlightening problem cases and examples which should stimulate classroom
discussion and individual research into specific problems. Whether the
practice of pointing out these by-paths in the text itself instead of leaving it to the teacher to suggest them in classroom discussion, will appeal to the individual teacher will depend upon his own preferences and
methods of teaching. Certainly the student of Damages who is denied
the opportunity of personal instruction will find this feature valuable.
The casebook also contains numerous excerpts from The Money
Value of a Man, by Dublin and Lotka. This inclusion of a substantial
amount of valuable material obtained from non-legal sources, but which
definitely relates to the question of damages is an innovation worthy of
mention, and one which other legal writers might adopt advantageously.
The legal profession can benefit greatly from a study of data and information collected, analyzed and interpreted by the social scientists and
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the experts in other extra-legal fields. The incorporation of such studies
into our textbooks and casebooks should, therefore, be commended.
JOHN C. STEDMAN.

School of Law, University of Wisconsin.
Law and the Lawyers, by Edward Stevens Robinson. New York, Macmillan, 1933. Pp. viii, 348.
"This book attempts to show that jurisprudence is certain to become
one of the family of social sciences-that all of its fundamental concepts
will have to be brought into line with psychological knowledge ...
American juristic realism has thus far been a critical rather than a constructive movement. It has seemed to me that the next step is a systematic cultivation of that area common to jurisprudence and psychology.
In the present book I have sought to make a beginning in that direction." (pp. v, vii)
Aligning himself definitely with the realists, the author has sprinkled
the first chapters with a variety of thrusts at the conservative and absolutist legal thinkers. These are likely to be received with mixed cheers
and boos by the audience of variously-minded lawyers. In the complacently ritualistic lawyer (and there still be such), this book may
awaken a distrust of concepts and beaten paths. But the more sophisticated, acquainted with contemporary realistic ranting, it will disappoint,
for like other such efforts, it debunks too much, and leaves the reader
groping for something which remains always, just around the corner.
As suggested in the first sentence quoted above, the place of psychology is held to be paramount in the projected re-vamping of legal
thinking. "If the jurist is to adjust his science to the temper of the
modern mind he will have to reject legal theories that are out of accord
with plain psychological facts and he will have to describe the legal institution and legal behavior in a manner congruous with psychology and
the other natural sciences" (p. 122). "Every important legal problem
is at bottom a psychological problem and . . . every one of the many
traditions about human nature which are to be found in legal learning
needs to be gone over from the standpoint of modern psychological
knowledge" (p. 51). Such coSperation between social scientists, psychologists, and lawyers is, of course, a "consummation devoutly to be
wished."
But what, more precisely, does this mean? Is the author (himself a
psychologist) ready to recommend to the legal thinker concepts, laws,
or principles that have 'been developed by psychological science, facts,
and formulations about human behavior that the lawyer should know?
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Is he about to furnish tools that have been found useful in psychological
investigation, methods of experimental and clinical and statistical procedure that the man of law should learn to use? Nothing so concrete I
The presentation takes rather the form of a general exhortation to develop the mental attitude of the psychologist-as-scientist: an openmindedness toward new facts and new ways of looking at facts, and that
detachment and impersonality found in the laboratory and clinic.
Now, there can be no doubt that in their extreme forms, the points
of view of lawyer and of natural scientist are about as antithetical as the
points of view of any two professionally trained men can well be. For
the one, formal considerations and consistency have seemed the main
truth-test, for the other, factual considerations and experimental repetition. The interests and employment of one have to do with the practical
implications of particular concrete cases leading to some answer as to
what is to be done; those of the other deal with phenomena isolated for
the moment from the complexities of particularities and examined as a
type. The occupation of the former is with conflicts, and he enters most
often as a partisan protagonist; the work of the latter is with "facts for
facts' sake."
No difference of human attitude and perspective of values could be
greater than this; and the author's plea that the man of law should-in
his r6le of specialist in human social arrangements-develop more and
more of the spirit of the man of science will still sound radical to some
legally-minded readers.
Adopting the methods of the social scientists, developing an empirical attitude, debunking of legal concepts . . . these proposals in themselves are not new. Their ring is perhaps becoming monotonous to
those (and they are legion) who have been hearing it so often. New
in this book is the fact that the general exhortations come from a nonlawman, a psychologist. And in that respect the book is welcome. As
propaganda it will serve a useful purpose.
Those many readers who are tiring of the almost purely destructive
character of the realistic movement are beginning to feel that it is time
to get their teeth into something. They are looking for the next stepafter the general exhortations found in Professor Robinson's book what
has the psychologist to offer the man of law ?
More specifically, psychology, as a result of experimental and clinical
studies, does have contributions to make. For example, psychological
findings show that under certain conditions a witness' correct seeing of
an event is seriously warped by any color blindness (occurring in six
per cent of males, though much less frequently in females), or by oncoming twilight in which an originally darker of two objects may look
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the lighter. If he hears a sound he is more likely to locate it erroneously
if it be straight-ahead or straight-behind than if it be off to one side.
Swearing does not guarantee accuracy, though it increases it. When
reporting on objects noticed, one is more likely to err in regard to their
colors and positions than in regard to their sizes and especially their
shapes. The loss of value of hearsay evidence is rapid between the
original and the second-hand observer, but a third- or fourth-hand narrator can give almost as good a story as the second-hand one. Dogs
do not make good detectives: after a trail is a half-hour old or if it is
crossed often they are likely to lead pursuers in a wrong direction and
to an innocent man; and as spotters of the guilty man in a line-up their
successes occur only when the latter "gives himself away." When a
witness lies, there are a few methods of revealing this indirectly by
laboratory ways of bringing out his hidden emotional stirred-up condition (by changes in respiration or blood-circulation or sweating or
finger-movements)-and these are not confused with the natural anxiety
of an innocent person charged with a crime; but only the most skillful
and experienced examiners can be trusted with this work. When a jury
has deliberated over the evidence offered by a number of witnesses, they
bring in a report less complete than the testimony or opinions of any
individual witness or individual juror but clearly more accurate than
that of any individual witness or juror. Concerning different clinical
types of the "insane" :-the paranoic is more prone to deeds of violence;
yet he is exceedingly difficult to detect because clever in his rationalizing. The dementia praecox individual may sometimes be given to impulsive acts like tearing his clothes, breaking windows, or even arson,
but usually he turns hobo or prostitute. The paretic is more likely to
perpetrate more violent crimes, and his case is doubly serious because
often unrecognized. The senile dement is given to more petty actssmall thefts, exhibiting his sex organs, picking quarrels, and the like.
Such illustrations are concerned largely with matters of court-room
procedure. Not new, their acceptance by courts is none the less gradual.
Only indirectly do they attack the validity of so-called fundamental legal
concepts of substantive law. Into that field psychologists and lawyers
must next move.
J. F. DASHIELL,
Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina.
J. E. MuLDER,
School of Law, University of North Carolina.

